University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

3-22-1957

Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier 48 Cal.2d 208 (1957).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/399

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

208

FARMLAND IRRIGATION CO.

[Sac. No. 6581.

In Bank.

tI.
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[48 C.2d

Mar. 22, 1957.]

FARMLAND IRRIGATION COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. GEORGE DOPPLMAIER, Appellant.

)

[1] S1Ulersedeas-Stay of Proceedings.-When an action is brought
in a court of this stllte involving the same parties and
subject matter as an aetion already pending in a court of
another jurisdiction, a stay of the California proceeding is
not a matter of right but within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and in exercising its discretion the court should
consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation
designed solely to harass an adverse party and of avoiding un.
seemly conflicts with courts of other jurisdictions, and
should also consider whether the rights of the parties can best
be determined by the court of the other jurisdietion bzeause
of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court
have advanced.
[2] ld.-Stay of Proeeedings.-In deciding whether the representation of plaintiff in an action in federal court in another state
was an adequate substitute for a present determination of its
rights in a California court, the California court was not bound
by the federal court's determination that the representation
was adequate to prevent intervention.
[3] ld.-Stay of Proceedings.-In an action for declaration of
plaintiff's rights and duties under the provisions of a patent
license agreement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant's motion for a stay of proceedings pending
final judgment in a prior action brought by defendant in
federal court in another state against plaintiff's assignor for
an accounting of royalties allegedly due under the license
where the federal complaint did not call for an adjudication
of the assignability of the license and plaintiff's rights thereunder, and those issues, because of denial of plaintiff's motion
to intervene, could not be adjudicated in that court.
[4] Patents - Actio!l3 - Law Gcverning.-Every action that involves, no matter how incidentally, a United States patent is
not for that reason governed exclusively by federal Inw, since
a patent is not granted without reference to the general powers
the states possess over their domestic affairs.

McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Supersedeas, § 2; [4-8, 30, 32)
Patents, §8; [9-13, 15-20, 2~26) Patents, §5; [14] Patents, §1;
[21-23] Assignments, § 13; [27] Patents, § 7; [28] Patents, § 2;
[29] Patents, § 9; [31) Appeal and Error, § 1088.
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[6] ld.-Actions-Jurisdiction.-'An action to set aside, specifically
enforce or recover royalties on a patent license contract is not
an action arising under the patent laws of the United States
for the purpose of determining the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts; state courts have jurisdiction over such
actions and, in the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is
exclusive of the federal courts.
[6] ld.-Actions-Law Governing.-The elements of plaintiff's
case in an action to recover royalties on a patent license are
Dot governed by the patent statutes or by federal decisional
law evolved to implement such statutes, but arise out of contract and depend on common law and equity principles.
['1] ld.-Actions-Law Goveming.-The law governing plaintiff's
case in an action to re~over royalties on a patent license is
state law, acting of its own force, and not merely by incorporation into federal law.
[8] ld.-Actions-Law Gov3rnine.-Not every issue in an action to
recover royalties on a patent license, including assignability of
the license, is necessarily governed by the state law; if the
policy of the patent laws or Ilome other federal statute requires it, state law must give way.
[9] ld.-Lillenses-Assignment.-The absence of any specific statutory provision governing assignability of a patent license
does not in itself mean that federal law does not control, since
. if the policy of the federal statute or the implications of the
federal system require a uniform rule of decision, the federal
courts have paramount power to fashion such rule.
[10] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-The existence of a line of federal cases establishing a rule of construction on the assignability of patent licen3es is no indication of a federal policy .
excluding state law where those cases involved no conscious
choice between state and federal law.
[11] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-The fact that Congress has expressly provided for the assignment of patents, thereby making
some aspects of the validity of such assignments questions of
federal law, does not show that any federal policy exists to
control the assignment of rights under a license.
[12] ld.-Licenses.-Licenses have no statutory basis, and rights
under them arise from contract rather than from the fact that
patent rights are involved.
[18] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-There is no policy underlying
the federal patent statutes that requires a uniform federal rule
of construction of license contracts to determine their assignability.

[9] See Cal.Jur., Patents, 14; Am.Jur., Patents, 1146 et seq.
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[14] Id.-Purpose-Law GoverniDg.-The purpose in granting a
patrnt monopoly is to promote progress in science and the useful
arts by stimulating invention and encouraging disclosure; so
long as state law does not destroy the advantages of the
monopoly, it respects the federal purpose, and there is no
reason why it should not govern, as with any other property,
the incidents attached to ownership of the patent.
[15] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-The value of a patent is not
affected by subjecting the patentee to state rules of construction on assignability of licenses; since the patentee must
in any event look to state law to determine most of his rights
under the license, no great inconvenience will be involved in
also ascertaining what the state law is on assignability.
[16] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-The value of a patent is not
significantly affected it the state applies a rule of construction
favoring assignability; such a rule would not hamper the
patentee's right to profit from his monopoly .by licensing under
it.
[17] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-Though Congress could legislate
on the subject of assignability ~f a patent license and thereby
onst state law, in the absence of such action the state Supreme
Court will not postulate a policy it cannot find in existing federal statutes, and if any federal interest exists it is
too remote and speCUlative to justify displacing state law.
[18] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-Although the question of assignability of a patent. license contract is one for determination
by state law, federal cases are persuasive authority because
of the experience of federal courts in the area of patents
and patent licenses.
[19] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-It is not necessary or wise to
establish a fixed rule, peculiar to patent licenses, that such
contracts are not assignable unless made expressly so; there
is no reason to exempt these contracts from a general rule
adapted to facilitate the freest possible transfer of valuable
contract rights, while at the same time respecting the parties'
intentions.
[20] Id.-Licenses-Assignment.-Nothing in the nature of patent
licenses makes the rights conferred by them necessarily so personal that the parties must have intended that they be nonassignable.
(21] ASsignments - Contractual Interests. - The state statutes
manifest a policy in favor of free transferability of all
types of property, including rights under contracts (Civ. Code,
§§ 954, 1044, 1458), but the terms and purposes of a contract may show,!hat it was intended to be nonassignable.

[21] See Cal.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 11 et seq.; Am.Jur.. AssignlIleDts, § 5 et seq.
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[22J ld.-Contractual Interests.-The duties imposed on one party
by a contract may be of such a personal nature that their performance by someone else would in effect deprive the other
party of that for which he bargained, and in such situation
they cannot be delegated.
[23] ld.-Contractual lnterests.-Rights cannot be assigned if the
assignment would materially impair the nonassigning party's
chance of obtaining the performance he expected.
[24] Patents-Licenses-Construction of Agreement.-Where an
inventor of improvements in agricultural sprinkling apparatus
entered into a license agreement with a corporation whereby
the corporation was given the right to make and sell apparatus
embodying the invention, in return for which it promised to
pay the inventor a royalty on sums received from licensed
sales, the inventor's failure to provide against the possibility
of a controlling stockholder's selling his interest in the corporation was a strong indication that he did not consider personal control by such stockholder essential, and a provision in
the contract permitting the corporation to sublicense showed
that the inventor did not intend to restrict enjoyment of rights
under the contract to an organization controlled personally
by such stockholder.
[25] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.-A provision in a lieense agreement between an inventor and a corporation that the inventor
could use any improvements on the invention during the
life of the contract did not invalidate the corporation's assignment of the license where the corporation did not obligate
itself to make improvements.
[26] ld.-Licenses-Assignment.- Where an inventor of improvements in agricultural sprinkling apparatus entered into a
license agreement with a corporation whereby the corporation was given the right to make and sell apparatus embodying
the invention and it promised to pay the inventor a royalty on
sums reeeived from licensed sales, and where the eorporation
was permitted to grant sublicenses and the inventor retained
the right to make and sell apparatus embodying the invention
and, within specified limits, to license others to do so, the
inventor was not assured of any definite royalty from the
corporation in the absence of any promise to produce and sell
a eertain number of sprinkler systems, and plaintiff, as assignee of the corporation, was not bound to sell a certain
number, and if defendant to whom the inventor assigned his
patent found the royalty returns under the license unsatisfactory, under the contract he was free, within the limits
specified, to lic..ense other producers, and the corporation's
assignment to'plaintiff did not impair materially defendant's
chance of obtaining the performanee for which the iDventor
bargained.
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[27] Id.-Royalty Contracts.-Wbere a license agreement between
an innntor and a corporation provided that the corporation
would pay the inventor a designated per cent of all "sums received from licensed sales," defined the quoted words as sums
received by the corporation or a sublicensee from sales or
leases of apparatus and parts thereof, the manufacture, sale
or lease of which would infringe any patent right in a "subject
invention" if this agreement were not in force, and defined
"subject inventions" as "inventions relating to the adaptation
of irrigation pipe lines for movement upon wheels secured to
irrigation pipe couplings and provided with a driving means,"
the corporation's assignee was bound to pay royalties only on
sums received from sales of wheel and coupling units; the
corporation was only interested in and willing to pay for the
right to USe the invention or the right to use what was new and
constituted progress over apparatus known to the trade, and it
was not reasonable to interpret the phrase "sums received •••
from sales . . . of apparatus and parts thereof" as imposing
a royalty on the sale of all parts of a sprinkling system if the
sale of anyone part would infringe the patent.
[28] Id.-Rights of Inventor-Subjects of Patent.-Improvement
in one element of a combination, although in a sense it makes
the combination a new thing, does not produce a patentable
combination: for the combination to be a patentable invention,
it must perform a new and different function, and it is Dot
enough that the improvement merely increases the efficiency
or convenience of the old combination.
[29] Id.-Infringement.-Where a licensor's only invention consisted in an improved coupling and such coupling was included only in the wheel and coupling units of sprinkling
apparatus sold by the assignee of a license granting the right
to make and sell apparatus embodying such invention, all
other parts of the apparatus on the published price list could
be soJd without infringing the licensor's patent.
[30] Id.-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for declaration of
rights and duties under a patent license which gave a corporation the right to make and sell sprinkling apparatus embodying the licensor's invention and which was allegedly assigned to plaintiff after the corporation's dissolution, it was
proper to permit the principal stockholder of the corporation
to testify that, before entering into the license contract, he had
asked counS!"j to make a search to determine if mounting
pipes on wheels was patentable and that counsel had reported
the exi5tence of another patent, since such evidence was relevant and competent to show that at the time of execution of
the contract such stoel,holder probably knew that mounting
pipes on wheels was not new lind thereby to show his understanding of tht;.<.IIature of the licensor's invention and the
meaning of the royalty provisions.
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[31J Appeal-Right to Allege Error.-A party who did not request
that the probative force of evidence introduced by the opposing
party be confined to a certain issue cannot complain on appeal
that other inferences could possibly be drawn from it.
[32] Patents-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for declaration
of rights and duties under a patent license which gave a corporation the right to make and sell sprinkling apparatus embodying the licensor's invention, it was proper to permit the
principal stockholder of the corporation to testify that certain features of the licensor's apparatus had been used by
such stockholder for some years in other apparatus, where
such stockholder was familiar with his firm's equipment and
was in a position to testify as to what features of the lieensor's
apparatus had been used before the licensor applied for a
patent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. James H. Oakley, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for declaratory relief.
firmed.

Judgment for plaintiff af-

Wilke, Fleury & Sapunor and Sherman C. Wilke for Appellant.
Theodore H. Lassagne and Naylor & Lassagne for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plainti:!i in this action seeks a declaratory
judgment that it is entitled to manufacture and sell irrigation
equipment under a patent license agreement and a declaration
of its duties under the royalty provisions of the license agree·
ment.
Darrell C. Mansur invented certain improvements in agrieultural sprinkling apparatus. He applied for a patent on
his invention, and in the autumn of 1949, while his application
was still pending, entered into negotiations with the Stout
Irrigation Company, an Oregon corporation (hereinafter referred to as Stout), for the purpose of licensing Stout to
manufacture and sell apparatus embodying the invention.
Stout was represented in these negotiations by William II.
Stout, its president and controlling shareholder, a man of
(,onsiderable experience in t.he irrigation equipment business.
Mansur, William I-I .. Stout, and defendant Dopplmaier were
nIl present at a ue1{lOnstration of apparatus embodying the
invention held near Fresno in September.

)
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On December 5, 1949, Mansur and Stout entered into the
license agreement that is the subject of this action. By this
agreement Stout was given the right to make or have made
and to sell apparatus embodying Mansur's invention, in return
for which it promised to pay Mansur a royalty of three per
cent of sums received from licensed sales. Stout was permitted
to grant sublicenses on condition that it assume responsibility
for the payment of all royalties due on sales by its sublicensees. Mansur retained the right to make and sell apparatus embodying the invention himself and to license others to
do so, except that he agreed not to sell to manufacturers or
distributors who were in business on December 5, 1949. Improvements in the invention made by either Stout or Mansur
could be used by the other during the life of the agreement.
Stout manufactured and sold irrigation apparatus under
the license until January 31, 1952. On that date the corporation was dissolved and its assets passed to its shareholders.
On February 2, 1952, the shareholders sold the assets, including choses in action, to plaintiff, a California corporation,
which proceeded to manufacture and sell under the license.
Meanwhile Mansur had obtained his patent and assigned it to
defendant together with his rights under the license. First
Stout, and later plaintiff, tendered royalties under the license
to Mansur and defendant, Mansur's assignee. The first
royalty payment was accepted without protest, but defendant
rejected later payments on the ground that they were computed on the basis of sums received only from sales of wheel
and coupling units, whereas the license called for a royalty
based on SUIns received from sales of the entire irrigation
apparatus or any of its parts.
In June, 1951, defendant commenced an action against
Stout in the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon for an accounting of royalties allegedly due under
the license. Plaintiff sought to intervene on the ground that
it had bound itself to pay any liability adjudged against
Stout, and that its interests were inadequately represented. It
also counterclaimed for a declaration of its rights under the
license as Stout's successor or assignee. The district court
denied the motion to intervene, and its order was later affirmed by the court of appeals on the ground that there was
no showing that plaintiff was inadequately represented on the
accounting issue, and that the issue made by the counterclaim
was not involved iIJ.-the action. (Farmland Irr. 00. v. Dopplmeier (9th Cir.), 220 F.2d 247.)
Plaintitf then commenced the present· action. A motion

)
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by defendant for a stay of prQceedings pending final judgment
in the Oregon action was denied. After trial on the merits,
the court adjudged that the rights granted Stout under the
license were assignable and had been assigned, through the
shareholders, to plaintiff, and that under the license plaintiff
was bound to pay royalties only on sums received from sales
of wheel and coupling units and not on sums received from
sales of any other parts of the apparatus. From this judgment defendant appeals.
We are confronted at the threshold with defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for a stay of proceedings. [1] When an action is
brought in a court of this state involving the same parties
and the same subject matter as an action already pending in
a court of another jurisdiction, a stay of the California proceedings is not a matter of right, but within the sQund dis- I
cretion of the trial court. In exercising its discretion the '!
court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party,
and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other
jurisdictions. It should also consider whether the rights of
the parties can best be determined by the court of the other
jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter,
the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced. (See
Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 123-131 [214
P.2d 844,19 A.L.R.2d 288] ; Pesquera del Pacifico, S. de R. L.
v. Superior Court, 89 Cal.App.2d 738, 740-741 [201 P.2d
553].)
The parties to the present action are not identical with
those in the Oregon action. Plaintiff is not a party to the
Oregon action; it attempted to intervene as a party defendant, but was successfully prevented from doing 80 by
defendant. Plaintiff brought the present action, not to harass
defendant with mUltiple litigation, but to assert interests it
claimed would not be adequately represented in the Oregon
action. Defendant contends that nevertheless plaintiff should
be compelled to await and be bound by the outcome of the
Oregon action. [2] In deciding whether the representation
of plaintiff in the Oregon action was an adequate substitute
for a present determination of its rights in a California court,
the trial court was not bound by the federal court's determination that the representation was adequate to prevent intervention.
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[3] Moreover, all the issues in the present action are not
involved in the Oregon action. (C/. Pesqucra del Pacifico, S.
de R.L. v. Superior Court, 89 Cal.App.2d 738, 741 [201 P.2d
553].) Although the complaint in the Oregon action calls for
an adjudication of the licensee's obligations under the royalty
provisions, the issue raised by plaintiff's second cause of action
in the present case, it does not call for an adjudication of the
assignability of the license and plaintiff's rights thereunder,
the issues raised by plaintiff's first cause of action. Plaintiff
sought to present these issues to the federal court in its counterclaim, but because the motion to intervene was denied, they will
not be adjudicated in that court. A stay of the present proceedings would therefore not only bring these issues no closer to
determination, but would compel plaintiff to await a judgment
that cannot respond to its need. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a stay that would have such an
effect.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding
that Stout's rights under the license were assignable and
had been assigned to plaintiff. Rights under a patent license.
defendant argues, are not assignable unless express consent
to assignment is contained in the license contract, and in the
absence of sueh consent the contract must be construed as
conferring purely personal, nontransferable rights. This rule
of construction appears to be set forth in a line of federal
cases of which the principal case is Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119
U.S. 226 [7 8. Ct. 193, 30 L.Ed. 369].
It is contended that because a United States patent is
the creature of a federal statute and can be assigned only
in the manner provided by federal law, the assignability of
rights under a patent license is also a federal question and in
the absence of statutory provision is to be determined by the
decisional law of the federal courts. This reasoning fails to
distinguish patent rights, whuse assignability is admittedly
governed by a specific statutory provision (35 U.S.C. § 261),
and rights created by a contract whose subject is exemption
from a patent monopoly. It misconceives the policy of the
federal patent statute and the relation between federal and
state law in the area of patent rights.
[4] Every action that involves, no matter how incidentally,
a United States patent is not for that reason governed exclusively by federal law. The police power of the states, for
example, has long been held to include reasonable regulation
of the manufac~ure and sale of patented articles dangerous
,.>
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to public safety (Patterson v. l(entucky, 97 U.S. 501, 503·
509 [24 L.Ed. 1115]), and regulation of the transfer of patent
rights to prevent fraud. (Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 355357 [27 S.Ct. 95, 51 L.Ed. 216].) A patent is not granted
without reference to the general powers the states possess over
their domestic affairs.
[5] It has been established by a long line of cases, moreover, that an action to set aside, specifically enforce, or
recover royalties on a patent license contract is not an action
arising under the patent laws of the United States for the
purpose of determining the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. (Wilson v. Sandford, 10 How. (U.S.) 99,101 [13
L.Ed. 344] ; Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613, 616-620 [1 s.et.
550,27 L.Ed. 295] ; Dale Tile Mfg. 00. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46,
51-54 [8 S.Ct. 756, 31 L.Ed. 683] ; Pratt v. Paris Gas Light
&: Ooke 00., 168 U.S. 255, 257-260 [18 S.Ct. 62,42 L.Ed. 458] ;
Excelsior Wooden Pipe 00. v. Pacific Bridge 00., 185 U.S.
282, 285·287 [22 S.Ct. 681, 46 L.Ed. 910]; New Marshall
Engine 00. v. Marshall Engine 00., 223 U.S. 473 [32 S.Ct.
238, 56 L.Ed. 513] ; Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496,
502-511 [46 S.Ct. 397, 70 L.Ed. 703]; Becher v. Oontoure
Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 [49 S.Ct. 356, 73 L.Ed.
752]; Pendleton v. Ferguson, 15 Cal.2d 319, 326-327 [101
P.2d 81, 688].) State courts have jurisdiction over such
actions, and in the absence of diversity of citizenship it is
exclusive of the federal courts. (See Henry v. A. B. Dick 00.,
224 U.S. 1, 14-15 [36 S.Ct. 364, 56 L.Ed. 645]; Dale Tile
Mfg. 00. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46, 53 [8 S.Ct. 756, 31 L.Ed.
683]. )
[6] These authorities were concerned with whether a case
was one" arising under the patent laws" within the meaning
of the federal jurisdictional statutes and the federal policy
apportioning business between state and federal courts. Nevertheless, since the jurisdictional test they established was
tied to the law that created the cause of action stated in the
complaint and made the source of that law its operative fact
(see American Well Works 00. v. Layne &: Bowler 00., 241
U.S. 257, 259-260 [36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987] ; Albright v.
Teas, 106 U.S. 613, 616-618 [1 S.Ct. 550, 27 L.Ed. 295]),
in holding that federal jurisdiction did not exist, they necessarily held that the patent statutes did not govern the elements
of the plaintiff's case.
Nor were the elements of the plaintiff's case -governed
bv federal decisimial law evolved to implement the patent
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statutes, for a ease founded on such law would have arisen
under the patent laws for jurisdictional purposes as much as
an action for infringement. As stated in Wilson v. Sanford,
10 How. (U.S.) 99, 101-102 [13 L.Ed. 344], "the dispute in
this case does not arise Under any act of Congress; nor does
the decision depend upon the construction of any law in
relation to patents. It arises out of the contract stated in the
bill; and there is no act of Congress providing for or regulating contracts of this kind. The rights of the parties depend
altogether upon common law and equity principles." The
absence of any elements of distinctively federal law, statutory
or decisional, in the plaintiff's ease was emphasized by eases
holding that, absent a question of the validity or scope of the
patent itself, there was no jurisdiction in the United States
Supreme Court to review state court decisions on patent
licenses. (Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard ~ Co., 140 U.S. 344,
354-357 [11 S.Ct. 798, 35 L.Ed. 413] ; Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v.
Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46,53 [8 8.Ct. 756, 31 L.Ed. 683].)
The plaintiff's cause of action arose under and was governed by the general common law of contracts. If the
action was in a federal court, the court applied its view of
the common law independent of state court determinations.
The question was not posed whether the governing law was
specifically state law and whether the law of a particular
state should be applied. In this judicial climate, the decisions
were rendered that defendant relies on as establishing a federal rule in respect to assignments of licenses. [7] In the
light of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 [58 8.Ct. 817,82
L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487], the law governing the elements
of the plaintiff's cause of action is state law-state law acting
of its own force and not merely by incorporation into federal
law. The language of Mr. Justice Holmes in American Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 [368.Ct.
585, 60 L.Ed. 987], a case involving an action for libel and
slander of the plaintiff's title to a machine the defendant
claimed infringed his patent, is appropriate: "But whether it
is a wrong or not depends upon the law of the State where the
act is done, not upon the patent law, and therefore the suit
arises under the law of the State. A suit arises under the
law that creates the cause of action .... The State is master
of the whole matter, and if it saw fit to do away with actions
of this type altogether, no one, we imagine, would suppose
that they still co~ld be maintained under the patent laws of
the United StateS." (See also S1mnen v. Commissioner of
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Int. Rev., (8th Cir.) 161 F.2d 171,175, rev'd on other
grounds, 333 U.S. 591 [68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898]; American
Machine &: Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co. (S.D.
N.Y.), 82 F.Supp. 556, 558, afi'd (2d Cir.) , 180 F.2d 342,
348, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 979 [70 S.Ct.1025, 94 L.Ed. 1383].)
This conclusion does not, however, completely dispose of
the problem. [8] Even if state law governs the basic elements of the plaintiff's case in an action to recover royalties
on a license, it does not follow that every issue in the case,
including the assignability of the license, is governed by state
law. (See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light &: Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255,
259-260 [18 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed. 458] ; Albright v. Teas, 106
U.S. 613, 616-618 [1 S.Ct. 550, 27 L.Ed. 295].) If the policy
of the patent laws or some other federal statute requires it,
state law must of course give way. (C/. Scott Paper Co. v.
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 254-257 [66 S.Ct. 101, 90 .
L.Ed. 47]; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317
U.S. 173, 175 [63 S.Ct. 172,87 L.Ed. 1651.) [9] Moreover,
the absence of any specific statutory provision governing the
issue does not in itself mean that federal law does not control,
for if the policy of the federal statute or the implications of
the federal system require a uniform rule of decision, the
federal courts have paramount power to fashion such a rule.
(See D'Oench, Duhme 47 Co. v .. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. 447, 456-458 [62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956], and see
Mr. Justice Jackson concurring at 469-475; Interaction of
National and State-Created Interests in Non-Diversity Fields,
47 Columb.L.Rev. 629.)
[10] On the other hand, the existence of a line of federal
cases establishing a rule of construction on the assignability
of licenses is no indication of a federal policy excluding state
law. These cases came, for the most part, before Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins, and therefore involved no conscious choice between
state and federal law. The federal cases since Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins, do not state what law· governs the issue (e. g.,
Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co. (8th Cir.), 168 F.2d
919, 922, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 [69 S.Ct. 249, 93 L.Ed.
430]), and decisions from the state courts have been equally
unenlightening on the applicable law. (Scltlesinger v. Regenstreif, 135 N.Y.S.2d 858, 862-863; Paper Producis Machine
Co. v. Safepack Mills, 239 Mass. 114 [131 N.E. 288].)
[11] The fact that Congress has expressly provided fC?r the
assignment of pate)lts themselves (35 U.S.C. § 261), and thereby made some aspects of the validity of such assignments
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questions of federal law (see Orown Die &- Tool 00. v. Nye
Tool &- Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24 [43 S.Ct. 254, 67 L.Ed.
516]; McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories 00. (3d
Cir.) , 138 F.2d 493), also does not show that any federal
policy exists to control the assignment of rights under a
license. [12] Licenses have no statutory basis, and rights
under them arise from contract rather than from the fact that
patent rights are involved. (See Ellis, Patent Assignments
and Licenses 229 (1936). )
[13] We can find no policy underlying the federal patent
statutes that requires a uniform federal rule of construction
of license contracts to determine their assignability. [14] The
purpose in granting a patent monopoly is to promote progress
in science and the useful arts by stimUlating invention and
encouraging disclosure. So long as state law does not destroy
the advantages of the monopoly, it respects the federal purpose, and there is no reason why it should not govern, as
with any other property, the incidents attached to the ownership of the patent. As was said in Patterson v. Kentucky, 97
U.S. 501, 508-509 [24 L.Ed. 1115], "There is no need of giving
this power [of monopoly] any broader construction in order
to attain the end for which it was granted, which was to
re,vard the benencent efforts of genius, and to encourage the
useful arts."
[15] The value of the patent is not affected by subjecting
the patentee to state rules of construction on assignability of
licenses. Since it is clear that the patentee must in any event
look to state law to determine most of his rights under the
license, no great inconvenience will be involved in also ascertaining what the state law is on assignability. [16] Also, the
value of the patent is not significantly affected if the state
applies a rule of construction favoring assignability. Such a
rule would not hamper the patentee's right to profit from his
monopoly by licensing under it.
[17] It may be that Congress could legislate on this subject
and thereby oust state law (see Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347,
356 [27 S.Ct. 95, 51 L.Ed. 216]), but in the absence of such
action we will not postulate a policy we cannot nnd in the
existing federal statutes. If any federal interest exists, it
is too remote and speculative to justify displacing state law.
(See Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 [77 S.Ct. 119,
121, 1 L.Ed.2d 93].) We conclude, therefore, that we are
free to make our owp"determination whether the assignability
of a license contraSt requires express consent in the contract.
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[18] Although the question is one for determination by the
law of this state, federal caseS are of course persuasive authority because of the experienbe of the federal courts in the
area of patents and patent licenses. The authoritative federal
statement that a patent license is not assignable unless made
expressly so is contained in Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226,
233-234 [7 S.Ct. 193, 30 L.Ed. 36'9]. The court stated that the
license was purely personal and was extinguished with the
dissolution of the corporate licensee, although it pointed to
no peculiarly personal rights involved. The court relied on
the earlier cases of Troy Iron &7 Nail Factory v. Corning,
14 How. (U.S.) 193, 216 [14 L.Ed. 383], and Oliver F. tf C.
Co. v. Rumford Chemical Works, 109 U.S. 75, 82 [3 S.Ct. 61,
27 L.Ed. 862]. The statement in the Troy case, however,
was not necessary to the decision, and in Oliver F. tf C. Co. v.
Rumford Chemical Works there were provisions in the license
calling for the exercise of the perS()nal skill of the licensee
that would have restricted transfer of rights under the license
even under ordinary rules of eonstruction. In Providence
Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 788, 799 [19 L.Ed.
566], another case before Hapgood v. Hewitt, the court found
the licensee's rights personal and nonassignable only after
examining the terms of the instrument and the testimony in
the record to ascertain the true meaning and purpose of
the contract. (See also Putnam v. Hollender, (C.C. S.D.
N.Y.) 6 F. 882,890-892.)
Many of the cases since Hapgood v. Hewitt can be explained
on the ground that language in the instrument or the purposes
of the contract clearly excluded assignability (e.g., Rock-Ola
Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co., (8th Cir.) 168 F.2d 919, 922,
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 [69 S.Ct. 249, 93 L.Ed. 430];
Reynolds Spring 00. v. L. A. Young Industries, Inc., (6th
Cir.) 101 F.2d 257, 260; Lanahan v. OLark Oar 00., (3d Cir.)
11 F.2d 820, 823; Niagara Fire Extinguisher 00. v. Hibbard,
(7th Cir.) 179 F. 844, 845 [103 C.C.A. 330), but nevertheless the rule of Hapgood v. Hewitt appears to have been
consistently adhered to by the federal courts, although without
any satisfactory explanation of the reasons underlying it.
(See Lane &- Bodley 00. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 195-196 [14
S.Ct. 78, 37 hEd. 1049J: Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument
00. (W. D. Mich.) 63 F.Supp. 591, 593, rev'd on other
grounds (6th Cir.}, 160 F.2n R78: Neon Signal De·uice.s. Inc. v.
A.lpha-01Q1Jde Neon Om·p. ,\V.D. Pa.), 54 F.2c1 793, 796;
Bowers v. Lake Superior Oont. & Dredging 00. (8th Cir.), 149
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F. 983, 986 [79 C.C.A. 493].) The only exception is when
the transferee succeeds to the entire business of the licensee,
and assumes all its assets and liabilities. (Lane &7 Bodley
Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193,196 [14 8.Ct. 78, 37 L.Ed. 1049].)
We are not persuaded that the United States Supreme Court
would, in view of the modern tendency in favor of assignability, adhere today to the rule it laid down in Hapgood v.
Hewitt. [19] Furthermore, we do not find it necessary or
wise to establish a fixed rule, peculiar to patent licenses, that
such contracts are not assignable unless made expressly so.
There is no reason to exempt these contracts from a general
rule adapted to facilitate the freest possible transfer of
valuable contract rights, while at the same time respecting
the parties' intentions. The federal eases have relied on the
flat statement that a license creates a merely personal right.
This statement should follow as a conclusion from an examination of the purposes and provisions of the particular license,
rather than stand as a self-evident first principle. [20] Nothing in the nature of patent licenses makes the rights conferred
by them necessarily so personal that the parties must have intended that they be nonassignable.
[21] The statutes in this state clearly manifest a policy
in favor of the free transferability of all types of property,
including rights under contracts. (Civ. Code, §§ 954, 1044,
1458.) The terms and purpose of a contract may show
however, that it was intended to be nonassignable. [22] Thus
the duties imposed upon one party may be of such a personal
nature that their performance by someone else would in effect
deprive the other party of that for which he bargained. The
duties in such a situation cannot be delegated. (See La Rue v.
Groezinger, 84 Cal. 281, 283-285 [24 P. 42, 18 Am.St.Rep.
179].) [23] Rights likewise cannot be assigned if the assignment would materially impair the nonassigning party's chance
of obtaining the performance he expected. (See 2 Williston,
Contracts, 1177-1182 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 Rest., Contracts, § 151
(1932).)
Defendant contends that if these principles are applied
to the license in the present case, the licensee's rights were
not assignable. His argument is that Mansur bargained for
William H. Stout's experience in manufacturing and selling
irrigation equipment, and intended that rights under the
license should be exereised only by a corporation controll<>d
by him; that if the~e -rights may be exercised by another, the
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value of defendant's right to receive royalties will be less
than was bargained for.
[24] There is no express provision in the contract against
assignment. Furthermore, nothing in the contract or the surrounding circumstances shows that rights under it were in- i
tended to be nonassignable. As the trial court pointed out, .
since Mansur did not testify and since apart from the instrument there was no evidence of his intentions, it was the barest
speculation to say that personal performance by William H.
Stout was an important inducement for him. The provision
in the contract permitting the corporation to sublicense shows
that Mansur did not intend to restrict enjoyment of rights
under the contract to an organization controlled personally
by William H. Stout. It is true that at the time the contract
was entered into William H. Stout owned a controlling interest in Stout. The contract was made, however, with a corporation, and a corporation by nature may change both· in
ownership and the agents through whom it acts. If William
H. Stout had simply sold his stock in the corporation, defendant could surely not contend that the corporation's rights
under the license would be extinguished. Since Mansur dealt
with a corporation, if he thought that control of the corporation by a particular person was essential to assure an advantageous return of royalties, he would have provided against
the possibility of that person's selling his interest. Mansur's
failure to do so is a strong indication that he did not consider
personal control by William H. Stout essential. (See Haldor,
Inc. v. Beebe, 72 Cal.App.2d 357, 365 [164 P.2d 568].)
[25] Defendant points to the provision in the contract that
if Stout makes any improvements on the invention, Mansur
may use them during the life of the contract, and argues that
Stout's interest in making such improvements is destroyed by
assigning its rights. Stout did not, however, obligate itself
to make improvements (see Fenn v. Pickwick Corp., 117 Cal.
App. 236, 240 [4 P.2d 215]), and, furthermore, if this provision invalidates Stout's assigi,nnent to plaintiff, the similar
provision that Stout may use Mansur's improvements invalidates Mansur's assignment to defendant. [26] Finally, Mansur was not assured of any definite royalty from Stout, for
Stout did not bind itself to produce and sell a certain number
of sprinkler systems, and plaintiff as assignee is not bound to
sell a certain number. If defendant finds the royalty returns
under the license unsatisfactory, under the contract he is
free, within limits, to llcense other producers. The assignment

224

FARMLAND IRRIGATION CO. tJ. DOPPLMAIER

[48 C.2d

did not impair materially defendant's chance of obtaining the
performance for which Mansur bargained, and therefore it was
effective to transfer Stout's rights to plaintiff.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in its
determination of the method of computing royalties under
the license. The license provided that Stout would pay
Mansur three per cent of all "sums received from licensed
sales." "Sums received from licensed sales" was defined
as-sums received by Stout or any sublicensee of Stout hereunder, from sales or leases of apparatus and parts thereof,
the manufacture or sale or lease of which apparatus would
infringe any patent right of Mansur in a subject invention
if this agreement were not in force. . . .
"SUbject inventions" was defined as-inventions relating
to the adaptation of irrigation pipe lines for movement upon
wheels secured to irrigation pipe couplings and provided with
a driving means, which inventions are disclosed and claimed
in a patent or a pending application now or hereafter filed
by or in behalf of Mansur and based upon a sole or joint
invention of Mansur, or as to which patent or pending application Mansur has or may acquire any right to grant a license
during the existence of this agreement.
Defendant's contention is that these provisions require the
payment of a royalty of three per cent of all sums received
from the sale of sprinkling systems embodying Mansur's invention, or any part of such systems, even if the invention
consists only in the improvement of one part of the apparatus
and not in the whole combination. Stout's published price
list of the parts it sold includes wheel and coupling units,
aluminum pipes, sprinklers, driving devices for rolling the
apparatus, hoses, and many other parts that make up an entire
sprinkling system. Defendant contends that a royalty is due
on sums received from sales of any of these parts for use in a
system embodying Mansur's invention, and not, as the trial
court held, only on sums received from sales of wheel and
coupling units.
[27] The contract is not a model of clarity, but we think
it is evident that what Stout was interested in and willing
to pay for was the right to use Mansur's invention, that is,
the right to use what was new and constituted progress over
apparatus already known to the trade. The first paragraphs
in the agreement state that Stout desires to manufacture
apparatus embodying certain improvements, that these improVe!IlA!IIliJI wer~>.embodied in apparatus demonstrated toO the
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parties, and that Mansur is the inventor of these improvements.
It seems highly improbable that Stout would agree to pay

royalties on parts long known, and which it had until the time
of the license sold royalty free. The provision defining sums
received from licensed sales provides in effect that a royalty
is due on sums received from sales that would, in the absence
of the license, infringe Mansur's patent. The computation of
royalties is tied directly to the test of infringement, and to
the determination of what was in fact Mansur's invention.
Defendant places great emphasis on the phrase: "sums
received . . . from sales . . . of apparatus and parts thereof. • . ." This phrase does not remove the necessity of
determining whether the sale of specific apparatus would in
fact infringe the patent; if it would infringe it, then a royalty
is due on the sale of that piece of apparatus, or any part of it.
It is not a reasonable interpretation of this phrase that it
imposes a royalty on the sale of all parts of a sprinkling
system if the sale of anyone part would infringe the patent.
It becomes necessary, therefore, in order to determine what
sales would .. infringe any patent right of Mansur in a subject
invention," to know what Mansur invented, and the extent
to which he advanced over prior art.
Mansur's claims describe an apparatus in which sections
of pipe are arranged end to end, each section of pipe joined
to the next one by a coupling. The coupling is secured to
the end of one section of pipe, and the end of the abutting
section of pipe is then inserted into the coupling through an
opening considerably larger than the diameter of the pipe
so inserted, and also through a flexible, water-tight seal inside
the coupling. Because of the size of the opening and the
flexibility of the water-tight seal, the sections of pipe so
coupled can assume angles relative to each other. Furthermore, a collar mounted on the inserted pipe section carries
two projecting arms that fit between ribs on the outside of
the coupling. These arms do not interfere with the pipe sections' assuming angles "relative to each other, but assure
that rotational force applied to one pipe section will be
transmitted through the coupling to a connected pipe section,
and then to the whole series of connected pipe sections. A
wheel is mounted on each coupling; since the wheel is rigidly
mounted and uses the sleeve of the coupling and the pipe as
ita hub, rotation of the pipe causes rotation oj the wheel.
Thus an entire line, of pipes can be rolled from place to place
.~
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with little effort, and without regard to unevenness in the
terrain. Water is pumped into one end of the line of pipes
and discharged through sprinklers set in the tops of the pipe
sections onto the crops to be irrigated.
As early as 1868, Abbott (British Patent No. 3,416) invented a sprinkling apparatus composed of a series of connected perforated tubes mounted on wheels. The wheels,
however, were not rigidly mounted on the tubes, but instead
used them as axles, so that the tubes did not themselves rotate,
and there was no need to transmit rotational force from one
tube to the next. Meyer went a step further. (British Patent
No. 157,727 (1921).) He patented an apparatus in which
wheels were mounted rigidly on connected pipes, so that
rotation of the pipes caused rotation of the wheels, and.
because the sections of pipe were rigidly coupled, rotational
force applied to anyone section of pipe was transmitted to
all. It does not appear, however, that the coupling between
the pipe sections permitted them to assume angles relative
to each other. Iverson's apparatus (United States Patent No.
1,373,660 (1921» was similar to Meyer's, and like it made no
provision for a coupling that would permit pipe sections to
assume angles relative to each other. Lanninger's apparatus
(German Patent No. 425,774 (1924» did include a coupling
that permitted the pipe sections to assume angles relative to
each other, so that a line of pipe sections could roll easily over
uneven terrain, but because the pipes did not rotate with the
wheels, no provision was made for transmitting rotational
force through the couplings.
An examination of these earlier patents shows that for some
time before Mansur's invention, irrigation pipes had been
equipped with sprinklers, coupled together, and mounted on
wheels. Moreover, couplings had been devised that permitted
the pipe sections to assume angles relative to each other, and
other couplings had been devised that transmitted rotational
force from one pipe section to all others. It remained for
Mansur to invent a coupling that performed both these
functions, and in this innovation, rather than in any combination of coupled pipes mounted on wheels, he advanced over
prior art. Agren (United States Patent No. 2,148,975 (1939»
had also devised a coupling that transmitted rotational force
and yet permitted connected shafts to move out of straight
alignment, but the coupling was not adapted for irrigation
purposes and was ~ni1icantly di1ferent in design· from

Kansur'..
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[28] Improvement in one element of a combination, although in a sense it makes the combination a new thing, does
not produce a patentable combination. For thE' combination
to be a patentable invention, it must perforrJ a new and
different function, and it is not enough that the improvement
merely increases the efficiency or convenience of the old combination. (General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co. (6th
Cir.), 203 F.2d 912, 917, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 822 [74 S.Ot.
37, 98 L.Ed. 348].) [29] Since Mansur's only invention
consisted in an improved coupling, and since this coupling is
included only in the wheel and coupling units sold by plaintiff, all other parts on the published price list can be sold
without infringing Mansur's patent. The trial court wa!':
correct in concluding that plaintiff was bound to pay royalties
only on sums received from sales of wheel and coupling units.
Defendant's final contention is that the court committed
errors in admitting certain evidence. We need not consider
the assignments of error concerning the admission of evidence
to show that plaintiff is the successor in business of Stout.
Since we have concluded that plaintiff took its rights under
the license by assignment, it is unnecessary to decide whether
it also took as a successor to Stout.
[80] Defendant contends that it was error to permit William H. Stout to testify that before entering into the contract
he had asked counsel to make a search to determine if mounting pipes on wheels was patentable and that counsel had
reported the existence of the Iverson patent. Defendant
claims that this testimony was immaterial, hearsay, and opinion evidence. The evidence was relevant and competent to
show that at the time of the execution of the contract William
H. Stout probably knew that mounting pipes on wheels was
not new and thereby to show his understanding of the nature
of Mansur's invention and the meaning of the royalty proVlSIOns. [81] Defendant did not request that the probative
force of the evidence be confined to this issue and cannot now
complain that other inferences could possibly be drawn
from it.
[82] William H. Stout was also allowed, over defendant's
objection, to testify that certain features of Mansur's apparatus had been used by Stout for some years in other apparatus.
There was no error here. Stout was admittedly familiar with
irrigation equipment, in particular with his own firm's equipment, and he w!1s'in a position to testify as to what -features
of Mansur '8 apparatus had been used before Mansur applied
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for a patent. He did not give an opinion on what part of
Mansur's apparatus was new art, the ultimate question of law.
and his testimony was proper in aiel of the r.onrt's determination of this issue. (See Smith v. 7'hompson (S.D. Ca1.), 43 F.
Supp. 848, 849.)
Judgment affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and :McComb, J., concurred.
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